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THE REQUIREMENT THAT A
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION
MAY HAVE ONLY
ONE CLASS OF STOCK
Editor's Note: On December 27, 1966, during the process of publication, Reg. 1.1371-1(g)
was amended, virtually adopting the Tax Court's view in the Gamman case. Some of
the author's conclusions should be considered in light of this development.

By JE D. McGAFFEY*
Small business corporations meeting the requirements of Subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code have become an increasingly popular
form of business organization.' A Subchapter S corporation is exempt
from corporate tax, but its shareholders are taxed on its earnings
whether distributed or not. The result of this specialized tax treatment
is similar to the tax imposed upon a business operating in partnership
form, although the technique utilized in determining the tax is different.
Subchapter S was enacted to make it possible for many businesses
to choose the type of legal organization best suited to their needs with
a minimum of tax consideration. 2 This freedom of choice of legal organization was intended to be limited to businesses of a relatively small
size, although no direct limitation was placed on the net worth or sales
of such corporations. 3 The enactment of Subchapter S represented a
legislative recognition that a single tax on corporate earnings at the individual level, at the time the earnings were earned by the corporation,
would be an appropriate method of taxation for certain types of corpor4
ations.
Only corporations meeting certain requirements are eligible to elect
Subchapter S treatment.5 All of these requirements must be carefully
analyzed by an electing corporation in view of the substantial unforeseen tax liabilities which may be imposed if the corporation is held not
to qualify. There is no tax imposed upon a corporation electing under
Subchapter S,6 as the shareholders are taxed on the entire earnings
whether distributed or not.7 Normally, the entire earnings will be distributed. The shareholder's normal desires to have cash for personal
purposes and to pay taxes on the earnings are supplemented by the fact
*LL.B. Harvard Law School (1961) Member of Firm, Foley, Sammond &
Lardner.
I The number of corporations using the election has increased from 72,000 in
1959 to 141,000 in 1963. Tax Coordinator Bi-Weekly Alert, Vol. 12, No. 19,
p. 2 (1966).
2 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1958-3 CuM. BULL. 1008.
3 A limit was rather placed on the number of shareholders. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954 §1371 (a) (1). Compare INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §1244.
4 For an analysis of the reasons for a double tax on corporate income see
McGaffey, The Rationale and Requirements of Section 337, 40 TAXEs 681

(1962).

5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1371.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1372(b).
7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1373.
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that should he transfer the stock, a distribution of those earnings at a
later date may subject his transferee to a second tax., Since a closely
held corporation not electing Subchapter S has strong tax motives not
to make any distributions, a corporation which knew it was not under
Subchapter S would normally have a substantially different dividend
policy than a corporation which considered itself qualified under Subchapter S. A corporation which is found to have lost its Subchapter S
status upon audit by the Internal Revenue Service will face an assessment for corporate income tax for prior years. If the corporation has
followed the practice of distributing its entire earnings, it may have a
substantial cash problem, since the dividends paid the shareholders
will normally be far in excess of what would have been paid the shareholders if this liability had been known.9 The unforeseen and retroactive nature of such liability makes it particularly harsh.
One of the requirements a corporation must satisfy to qualify for
Subchapter S treatment is that the corporation have only one class of
stock.' 0 This requirement is deceptive in its simplicity. The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that the mere labeling of rights embodying
a legal relationship will not be controlling."
I. THE REASONS FOR THE REQUIREMENT OF ONE CLASS OF STOCK
The reasons for this requirement are important-to the practitioner
that he may be aided in properly interpreting the requirement's boundaries, and to the legislator that he may determine the requirement's necessity.
Although it is clear that Congress intended Subchapter S treatment
to be available only to relatively closely held and presumably small corporations,'12 there is no reason to believe that the restriction that a small
business corporation have only one class of stock was intended to be
related to a restriction on the size of the corporations qualifying for
Subchapter S treatment. In fact, closely held corporations often will
have more than one class of stock because of differing family interests
and problems of control, while large publicly held corporations often
3
will have only one class of stock.'
It is also unlikely that this requirement was imposed in order to prevent any type of tax avoidance through the utilization of more than one
class of stock in a Subchapter S corporation. There might have been
8 Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(e) (1959).
9 If the corporation had $25,000 of income and was not a Subchapter S corporation, it would have corporate taxes of $5,500 leaving $19,500. The same
corporation believing it was under Subchapter S may have distributed as
dividends the entire $25,000. In such a situation the shareholders may be
entitled to a refund, if the corporation did not have prior earnings and profits,
as the current addition to earnings and profits would be only $19,500.
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1371 (a) (4).
" Rev. Rul. 309, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 333; Rev. Rul. 226, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 341.
12 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1958-3 CUiM. BULL. 1008.
13 It may even be considered more desirable for a publicly held corporation not
to have several classes of stock.
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concern that some family partnership problems would have occurred
in the event that Subchapter S treatment was available to a corporation
with more than one class of stock. All the common stock might be
owned by the father who was active in the business with all the preferred stock which shared in earnings being owned by his children.
This could result in what might be thought to be a distortion of the
allocation of taxable income. However, the Commissioner is given an
adequate tool to deal with this problem in his power to apportion income between members of a shareholder's family as to reflect the value
of services rendered to the corporation by such shareholders. 14 If the
earnings are not due to the rendering of services but represent a return
on capital, it would be appropriate that they be allocated to whoever had
provided the capital even though that capital may have been given to
such person.
There is also the possibility of the reverse concern; that in a business where capital was the main income producing factor, the father
might contribute a large amount of the capital for preferred stock and
the children a small amount for the common. It might be thought that a
disproportionate share of the earnings would be attributed to the children who would be in a lower tax bracket. However, they would be
the ones entitled to such earnings by means of distribution or by means
of growth on the equity value of the stocks. A partnership, by agreement, could provide similar rights. Such a capital structure may be an
advantageous estate planning device to transfer the future appreciation
to the children, but this could be accomplished with a nonelecting corporation. If there was concern that the preferred might bear an unreasonably low dividend rate (and this could not be attached by other
means), a special provision for allocation might be used as in the services area. However, if the common stock was being given to the children, the relative rights of the preferred and common would be considered in valuing the common stock for gift tax purposes. Although
this theory is a possible explanation of the one class of stock requirement, it seems unlikely unless support were to be found in the legislative
history.
The congressional committee reports in 1958, the year Subchapter
S was enacted, do not mention the reason for requiring small business
corporations to have only one class of stock.' 5 In 1954 the Senate advanced the predecessor provisions of Subchapter S which would have
taxed such corporations as partnerships. Although the treatment then
proposed was somewhat different from the ultimate provisions contained in Subchapter S, the 1954 proposed legislation did contain the
requirement that the corporation have only one class of stock. The com14 INT. REV. CODE OF
15

1954 §1375(c).

S. REP. No. 1983 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1958-3 Cum. BULL. 1008.
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mittee report indicates that this was to prevent the complexities which
would result from having to allocate earnings among several classes of
stock. 16 In particular, the committee was concerned with the administrative problem created by the payment of dividends on preferred stock
in excess of the current year's earnings.' 7 The committee reports in
1964 when some provisions of Subchapter S were amended, lend further support to the theory that the reason for the requirement is administrative ease."" If this is the reason, rather than one founded upon tax
equity or economic policy, the requirement should not be unnecessarily
expanded beyond the area dealing with the technical problem of allocating earnings. Therefore, in the determination of what constitutes a
separate class of stock, the effect differing rights may have upon the
allocation of earnings should be the decisive factor. Thus, for the purpose of qualifying under Subchapter S,19 differing rights unrelated to
allocation of the corporation's earnings should not be considered to give
rise to a second class of stock.
The problems of allocating earnings, had more than one class of
stock been permissible, should be further analyzed to determine the extent of the administrative problem. In the case of a class of stock which
has a preference as to dividends and as to liquidation rights, there
would be no problem in allocating earnings in the event the earnings
were sufficient to cover the preferred dividends each year. Whether or
not the preferred dividend was paid, the preferred stockholder could
be taxed on the amount of the dividend which he would receive either
that year or in some later year, and the excess earnings would be taxed
to the holders of the common.
The Senate Finance Committee report raised the problem of a distribution to preferred stockholders of dividends in excess of current
earnings which represented earnings previously taxed to common stockholders.2 0 This problem can best be explained by example. Assume
that in the year 1964, the corporation has $1,000 of income and
distributes the required dividend to its preferred stockholders of
$500 and does not distribute the remaining $500. In the year 1965, it
has no earnings and distributes the $500 retained to its preferred stockholders in satisfaction of their dividends. In the year 1964 the preferred
stockholders would be taxed on the $500 of income distributed to them,
and the common stockholders would be taxed on the undistributed taxable income as being $500 of dividend income. However, in the year
1965, the preferred stockholders would not be taxed on the $500 of
16 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 119, 453 (1954).
17Ibid.
Is S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 146 (1964).
19 However, the legislative history does suggest that differing voting rights would
constitute a second class of stock. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1954).
20 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 453 (1954).
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income when it was distributed to them, unless the corporation had
current earnings and profits to that extent or there were accumulated
earnings and profits. 21 As the Senate Finance Committee report indicates, this causes a certain amount of inequity.2 2 The preferred stock-

holders should be taxed on this distribution and the common stockholders, which now in effect have lost their interest in the undistributed
income, should obtain some tax benefit in all fairness.
The common stockholder's remedy in this situation, as in the situation where there is both preferred and common stock, would be to cause
all income to be distributed out to the shareholders. It would seem quite
inadvisable from a tax point of view to not distribute out all of a Subchapter S corporation's earnings. 2 An additional legislative remedy to
the problem of the preferred and common stockholders would be to
give the common stockholder a loss in 1965 for the $500 which he paid
tax on and which is now being distributed to the preferred stockholder.
This would be equitable since the $500 excess retained earnings which
was previously available to the common stockholder would be transferred to the preferred stockholder because of the lack of any income
in 1965. In order to avoid any possible manipulation, the right to the
loss could be personal just as the right to previously taxed income is
under the present provisions. Only the stockholder who had paid the
tax in 1964 could obtain the benefit of the loss in 1965. The stockholder's tax rate in 1965 might be different than his rate in 1964 but
that problem is present under the current rules on previously taxed income. This proposed rule should also apply in the event no distribution
is made in 1965. In effect, the $500 is still being transferred from the
common shareholder to the preferred shareholder. The preferred shareholder should be taxed on the amount in 1965, and the common shareholder should be given the benefit of the loss thereof. This proposed
rule also would assume that any right to unpaid dividends would affect
liquidation value, since otherwise the preferred stockholder would be
inequitably treated from a nontax point of view. In the event that the
stock was noncumulative, there would not be a problem. If a dividend
was not paid in that year, there would be no transfer of earnings from
the common to the preferred stockholder.
An even more difficult problem of allocating earnings arises in the
case of losses where there is more than one class of stock. Presumably
in the preferred and common stock case, the first loss should be suffered
21The $500 constructive dividend to the common stockholders reduces earnings
and profits. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 §1377(a). Thus the corporation would have

no accumulated earnings and profits unless they had been accumulated prior
to 1964 or earnings and profits exceed taxable income.
22S. RE,. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 453 (1954).
23 If the corporation has accumulated earnings and profits, it may not be possible
to distribute them tax free at a later date because of the limitations on the
previously taxed income provisions. See Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(e) (1959).
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by the common stockholders, but this would be a question of fact. It
would be very difficult to determine at what point the preferred stockholders also suffer some losses. Perhaps, there could be a presumption
that the first losses would be against the common stockholders to the
extent of their capital accounts and that once the losses exceeded these
amounts, the loss would then be deductible by the preferred stockholders. This would have some analogy to the present rules concerning
24
the basis of a shareholders stock and indebtedness.
If such a rule were adopted and common stock was sold, the shareholder might not have enough basis to sustain the loss and yet the full
amount of the capital account might not have been consumed. Assume
a preferred stock account of $40,000 and a common stock account of
$60,000. If in 1964 there was a $20,000 loss, it would be charged against
the common stockholders. If the common stock was then sold for
$25,000 and the corporation in 1965 sustained a $30,000 loss, it would
still be allocable against the common stock account which would have
$40,000 still remaining in it-yet the shareholder holding the common
stock could only utilize $25,000 of the loss. 2 5 Such a result, however,

would not be as detrimental to the taxpayer as prohibiting a second
class of stock.
Although it appears that for normal situations Subchapter S rules
could be devised to allow more than one class of stock, there can be no
doubt that Subchapter S would be that much more complicated and that
Congress can well deem that the disadvantages caused by such complexities would outweigh the advantages. It must be noted particularly
in this connection that when the provision was first suggested in 1954,
there was a requirement that each stockholder be active in the business. 26
Thus the importance of having a preferred stock was not as great as
the more lenient provisions now contained in Subchapter S.
II.

DIFFERENT CLASSES OF STOCK PURSUANT TO THE
STATE'S CORPORATE LAW

In view of the statutory provision and particularly the regulations
issued thereunder, it would seem quite inadvisable to attempt to have
outstanding shares of stock, which a state's corporate law would treat
as different classes of stock. However, the regulations do make clear
that it is only the outstanding stock that is considered and that merely
having authorized stock or even treasury stock which is of a different
class will not void the Subchapter S election.2 7 It has been suggested
that if the only difference is par value or no par value, there are not two
24

INT. REv. CODE OF

1954 §1376(b).

The remaining loss, however, was recognized on the sale of the stock.
26 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 453 (1954).
27 Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g) (1959).
25
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classes of stocky 8 In addition the Service has ruled that special stock
required by the Federal Housing Administration under certain of its
regulations would not be deemed a separate class of stock. 29 Whether
this last position would be taken by a court in the absence of a favorable
ruling seems questionable, and it would seem to be a doubtful precedent
to rely on in other situations. However, this ruling does indicate, to an
extent, a reasonable attitude in looking at the situation in terms of the
rationale behind the rule. The various factors which might be differentiated under the corporate law and which might result in separate
classes of stock thereunder, should be evaluated to determine whether
or not these should constitute separate classes of stock under the rationale of the Subchapter S rule.
A. Varied Voting Rights. The regulations are clear that a class of
stock which has different powers of control or different voting rights
will be considered a different class of stock. 30 Furthermore, the 1954
legislative history would tend to support such a position since it does
mention voting rights. 3 1 The Tax Court has held that a corporation had
more than one class of stock when the outstanding stock was divided
into four classes, each class having the power to elect one director, all
other rights depending upon the number of shares held.31a The purpose
of this capital structure was to allow each of the four shareholders to
elect one director, even though their other interests in the corporation
differed. Nevertheless, if the only difference is voting rights, it is difficult to see the justification for not allowing such a corporation to be
taxed as a Subchapter S corporation. If the only justification for such
a rule is the problem of allocating profits, the rule should have no
application to situations in which the only difference is voting rights
which have nothing to do with allocation of profits. Furthermore,
it should be pointed out that voting rights may be particularly insignificant in a small corporation. Certainly, the question of effective voting
power does not seem to be a necessary requirement under the Code. In
the case of a corporation in which one stockholder has more than twothirds of the voting stock, whether the remaining stock is voting or not
has little if any effect upon the operations of the corporation. Furthermore, in the normal small corporation, the question of whether or not
this minority has voting power may be much more a psychological
matter with the majority stockholders rather than a question of the
minority's economic significance.
A possible justification for the result that varied voting rights deny
a corporation Subchapter S treatment would be by analogy to the provi2sCaplin, Subchapter S and its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations, 13
VAND. L. REv. 185, 190 (1959).
29 Rev. Rul. 309, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 333.
30
Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g) (1959).
31 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 453 (1954).
338 Pollack, 47 T.C. No. 9 (Oct. 28, 1966).
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sions for the taxation of trusts. A loophole might be created if the dominant shareholder wanted to keep complete control of the corporation
but transferred part of its stock to his children. By retaining control the
stockholder can determine whether the corporation would pay out dividends. If such a structure had been created by means of trust rather
than a corporation, the person in control would be subject to tax.32 This
seems to be an extreme stretch of the normal rules, particularly when
33
Subchapter S corporations cannot be merely incorporated pocketbooks
and non-Subchapter S corporations can achieve this same result. Furthermore, the same result is reached if the controlling stockholder has
over 50 per cent of the stock.
Another argument justifying denial on this account might be that if
the shareholder has no vote, he has no power to determine whether or
not a dividend is paid to him. He would have no control even though he
is affected by whether or not it is distributed, since if it is not distributed, he is subject to tax in the amount of income. This analysis
would seem to break down for two reasons: (1) that this may be true
in any situation in which he does not have a majority vote since the
majority determines whether a dividend is paid, and (2) such a stockholder would have adequate protection by the easy means which he has
for terminating the election under Subchapter S and thereby avoiding
any tax on undistributed earnings. 34 However, no matter how strong
the logic may be that a mere difference in voting rights alone should
not constitute the stock a separate class for purposes of Subchapter S
treatment, it would take a brave court to reach such a result, in view of
the regulations and the legislative history and the literal language of the
statute.
B. Differences in Dividend Rights. Classes of stock which do provide for differences in dividend rights do present the problem of allocation and therefore, as indicated above, form a justification for not applying Subchapter S treatment even though certain arbitrary rules might
have been adopted to take care of these problems.
C. Differences in Liquidating Rights. Although it is uncommon for
classes of stock to have similar rights as to dividends but to give one
class a preference upon liquidation, the regulations would indicate that
it would be considered a separate class of stock. 35 If the amount of liquidation is a set amount which does not vary depending upon earnings, this would cause substantial problems in allocating earnings. While
undistributed earnings could be paid out in dividends to such a class, in
the event they were not paid out they would not go to such a class upon
1954 §674.
No more than twenty percent of the corporation's gross receipts can be certain

32 INT. REv. CODE OF

33

types of passive income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1372(e) (5).
34 Apparently, a shareholder could terminate the election by transfering

one
share to a nonelecting stockholder or a trust. Treas. Reg. §1.1372-4(b) (1959).
35 Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g) (1959).
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liquidation. However, a class of stock, which upon liquidation shares
equally with a preference equal to its par value, would not seem to present any problems in connection with allocating profits upon the gain
side. In the event of losses an allocation problem would result. Although
some possible solutions might be devised, as is indicated in discussing
the rationale of the rule requiring one class of stock, it would certainly
be a reasonable position that the complications attending this class of
stock are so great that it should be considered a separate class.
The problems in the area of more than one class of stock do not
usually result from the intentional establishment of classes of stock
which the corporate law would view as being separate, but rather are
due to specialized rules under the tax law. These rules give rights to
certain individuals which result in the reclassification of their stock.
This, without warning, retroactively voids the Subchapter S election.
III. THIN CAPITALIZATION
A current problem under the one class of stock rule, which may only
be the predecessor to a number of other possible problems, is the treatment of a corporation that is thinly capitalized. 3 The Service has taken
the position in its regulations that if a debt obligation is actually stock, it
will be considered to be a second class of stock.3 7 The Service has taken
the position in litigation that if the corporation is thinly capitalized, the
debt does constitute stock.38
A. Analysis of thin capitalization under the rationale of the one
class requirement. On first analysis, the question of ease of allocation of
gains and losses may not seem to pose a significant problem in the case
of thin capitalization. The rights of debt, as specified by the instrument,
at least are fixed; and there is not the question, as there is for preferred
stock, of discretionary action by the board of directors in declaring dividends. Certainly, a loss by the corporation is borne by the common stockholders; and the Subchapter S provisions take care of the situation
where losses exceed the basis of the common stock, and the common
stockholder has debt, by permitting the recovery of the debt after the
39
entire basis in stock has been consumed.
The existence of the above described provision should be given
significant weight in determining the treatment to be given to Subchapter S corporations in the case of thin capitalization. A situation in which
the losses exceed the stockholder's basis in his common stock and would
corporation is thinly capitalized, if some or all of its debt is treated as
equity for tax purposes. The term is derived from the fact that normally
such corporations have a high ratio of debt to equity. However the doctrine
has developed to7 relying on factors other than such ratio.

36A

s Treas. Reg. §1.13 1-1(g) (1959).
3SCatalina Homes, Inc., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964); Henderson v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (D. Ala. 1965); W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C.
39

No. 1 (April 4, 1966).
REV. UODE OF 1954 §1376.

INT.
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apply against the stockholder's debt would be one which would raise
questions of thin capitalization. Thus, Congress clearly intended to make
some provision for this case. 40 However, the thin capitalization problem
has the potential of presenting the same difficulty in allocation as concerned the Senate Committee in the 1954 reports. Assume the corporation in 1963 has $300 worth of income after deducting interest of $100
which is later determined to be nondeductible by reason of the corporation being thinly capitalized. Therefore, the corporation has taxable
income of $400. If the interest was paid out this would mean that although the corporation has $400 taxable income, presumably it would
have only $300 of undistributed taxable income. The distributed $100
would be considered a distribution of earnings. If the $100 of interest
were not distributed until 1964, and the corporation had no income that
year and no accumulated earnings and profits, it would not be taxed
to the holders of the notes. This result would occur because the entire
$400 in 1963 was treated as undistributed taxable income and the $100
distribution in 1964 was treated as a dividend.
The problem arises only because the interest is not treated as interest
and can be avoided by permitting it to be treated as interest.
Furthermore, it is submitted, that the likelihood of such events occurring in the thin capitalization case are considerably less than in the
case of preferred stock. It is unlikely that in a thin capitalization case
interest would be paid in a year in which no earnings of the corporation
were earned. The mere fact of the payment of interest in such a year
would be a strong indication that the corporation was not thinly capitalized but was treating the amount as debt. Whereas, in the case of
preferred stock, it may well be that dividends would be continued on
the preferred if there were past earnings, even though there were no
earnings in the current year. Furthermore, if the debt is held pro rata
by the holders of the common stock, it is fair for the interest payments
not to be subject to tax since a tax has been paid by the common stockholders on these amounts. It would be quite likely in a thin capitalization
case that the debt would be held by the same people holding the common
stock, whereas in the case of preferred stock there would be much less
likelihood that the debt would be held by the holders of the common.
It should be pointed out that there is no problem of allocation in
situations where the debt does not bear interest or in cases in which
interest is not paid in the years in which there are no earnings. In view
of the limited likelihood of the various events taking place and in view
of the fact that the sections contemplated that a corporation might at
least be so close to being thinly capitalized that it would have losses that
would exceed the total amount of the common stock, the Service could
40

It is, of course, theoretically possible for the debt to have been incurred at
some time prior to the losses when it appeared that the debt could be repaid.
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make a different determination of the relative weight to be given to the
the problems of allocation as compared to the merits of allowing small
businesses to formulate their own corporate structure.
B. Analysis in terms of the factors affecting thin capitalization.
The factors which have been considered in determining whether a nonSubchapter S corporation is thinly capitalized are beyond the scope of
this article. 41 It is assumed that the tests for a Subchapter S corporation
will be no more severe. 4 2 Rather the question of thin capitalization in
the Subchapter S corporation might quite justifiably be given different
consideration than that for normal corporations. The thin capitalization
cases have normally arisen as controversies concerning three tax consequences: (1) the deductibility of interest paid by the corporation, 43 (2)
the effect of the distribution of the funds from the corporation in payment of the principal, 44 (3) the treatment of the loss on the debt.45 The
doctrine of thin capitalization arises because a stockholder dealing with
his own corporation may well not deal with it as disinterestedly as third
persons would, and therefore the name which certain transactions are
given cannot be allowed to govern tax consequences in which the tax
treatment would be favorable to the shareholder. In a Subchapter S
corporation these favorable effects, however, are not available. 46
In determining the capitalization of a normal corporation, the fact
that interest is deductible to the corporation and thus is a lesser net
expense to the corporation than dividends is commonly considered. In a
Subchapter S corporation, however, since there is no tax at the corporate level, there is no question of attempting to avoid the double tax by
paying interest rather than dividends. There can be no incentive to
capitalize a corporation to obtain this tax advantage.
For articles dealing with this subject see: Caplin, The Caloric Count of a
Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 31 (1959) ; Bittker. Thin Capitalization;
Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES 830 (1956); Crumbley, Avoid Unintentional Disqualifications of Subchapter S Corporations, 44 TAXES 374 (1966);
Aaron8, Debt v. Equity: Special Hazards in Setting Up the Corporate Capital
Structure, 23 J. TAXATION 194 (1965); Dixon, The Interest-Dividend Syndrome: What are the Criteria Now, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1267
(1966).
42
However, it may be more advisable to be more cautious in dealing with Subchapter S corporations because of the risks involved. In view of the factual
nature of the problem of thin capitalization, advance rulings cannot be obtained. Rev. Proc. 31, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 947.
43 See e.g., Gooding Amusement Co., Inc. v. Commissioner 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956); Wood Preserving Corp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. United States, 347
F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1965); Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th
Cir. 1963).
44 See e.g., Gooding Amusement Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956) ; Moughon v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964): P. M.
Finance Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1962).
45 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1959) ; Arlington Park Jockey
Club, Inc. v. Sauber, 262 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1959).
46 Caplin, Subchapter S and its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations, 13
VAND. L. REv. 185, 191 (1959).
4
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Similarly, the obtaining of cash from the corporation as repayment
of a debt is utilized in normal corporations in order to distribute accumulated earnings of the corporation without paying a dividend tax. Since
earnings of a Subchapter S corporation are immediately taxable to the
shareholder and can be distributed to him tax free, this incentive is
substantially reduced.

47

The question of the loss treatment is one which is confined to normal corporations. An individual who loans money to a corporation,
unless he can show that he is in the business of lending money, cannot
get an ordinary deduction.4" In fact, the situation is much reversed by
the use of section 1244 stock, where the ordinary loss benefit is normally available to stock. Thus, in the Subchapter S corporations, the
classification of advances to the corporation as debt rather than as contributions to capital, will seldom if ever be motivated by tax considerations, which is not the case with non-Subchapter S corporations. Therefore, the question of classifying a Subchapter S corporation as being
thinly capitalized, basically relates to the area of qualifying for Subchapter S treatment rather than any other tax consequences. Viewed in
that light, classifying such amounts as bona fide debt would not result
in tax avoidances from a Subchapter S corporation's point of view.
Because of the lack of any tax advantages in having debt in a Subchapter S corporation, some of the early writers assumed that there
would be no thin capitalization problem in Subchapter S corporations. 49
C. Case Law Development. Despite the above arguments the Service has taken a clear position in its regulations that it will deny Subchapter S treatment if a corporation is thinly capitalized. 50
The first case to raise the question of thin capitalization in a Subchapter S corporation was Catalina Homes, Inc.51 A Mr. Spano controlled 65% of the corporation's stock. He owned 51% outright and was
voting trustee of a voting trust holding another 14% owned by the
other members of his family. A Mr. Blackshaw controlled the other
35% of the stock. He owned 1% outright and was voting trustee of a
voting trust holding 34% of the stock, in which his son had the beneficial interest. The initial amount contributed for the stock was $10,000.
Mr. Spano loaned the corporation $45,500 on open account, and Mr.
It would still be applicable, if there were earnings and profits accumulated
prior to making the election. However, to distribute these, loans would have
had to have been made prior to making the Subchapter S election. Otherwise,
the funds advanced on the loans would be merely repaid.
48Treas. Reg. §1.166.5 (1959) ;see e.g., Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193
(1963).
49 Manly, Election under Subchapter S can Eliminate Thin Incorporation Problem, 9 J. TAXATION 322, 323 (1958) ; Note, How to use Election under New
Law to Save Taxes on Small Corporation Owners, 9 J. TAXATION 263 (1958);
but see Roberts and Alpert, Subchapter S: Semantic and Procedural Traps in
its Use; Analysis of Dangers, 10 .. TAXATION 2 (1959).
50 Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g) (1959).
5133 P-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964).
47
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Blackshaw loaned it $24,500 on open account. (It should be noted that
these are in direct proportion to their families' holdings.) In addition,
at the end of the year, the corporation was indebted to banks in the
amount of $93,600. There was a stockholder's agreement between Spano
and Blackshaw which contained provisions that the balances of the
loans would bear 5% interest payable from time to time as determined
by the board of directors and that the stockholder's advances were preferred over the no par common stock to the extent that dividends could
not be paid on the common stock until the advances and a 5% return
52
had been paid to Spano and Blackshaw.
The court, after analyzing the various factors involved, determined
that the corporation was thinly capitalized. It considered taxpayer's argument that there was no tax avoidance purpose. The court conceded
that the interest deduction advantage was not available but pointed out
that this is not the only tax avoidance purpose. However, it did not indicate any other tax avoidance purposes that would be available in a Subchapter S corporation. The court then held, without elaborating its
reasoning, that the advances constituted a separate class of stock. 53
Certainly, these advances involved all the aspects of preferred stock
except the labeling as such. In addition, there would be some practical
difficulty in allocating profits, in this situation, as the taxpayers who
made the advances did not own the common stock. However, the company had been profitable, and there was no indication that there had
been payments of interest in years in which the company did not have
earnings.
In Henderson v. United States,54 the Henderson Mining Co. had
capital stock of 30 shares for which $3,000 had been paid. Mr. Henderson owned 18 shares, and Mr. Anderson and Mr. Ward each owned six
shares. They were engaged in a mining business and acquired machinery
having a cost in excess of $143,000. The board authorized borrowing of
$150,000. Shortly after organization, Mr. Henderson advanced $36,000.
The other shareholders made pro rata advances. The corporation lost
$22,000 in its first year of operation. The question before the court is
the deduction of the loss on Mr. Henderson's tax return. Promissory
notes providing for 8% interest had been issued for the advances. However, no interest had been paid by the end of the first fiscal year, although interest was paid thereafter. The court discussed the question
of thin capitalization and determined that the advances were devoted to
the risk of the business. The court, without discussion, found that the
52 There is an interesting question of fact that is not completely explained. The
court notes that some $33,000 had been distributed to shareholders which was
considered dividends for tax purposes, although it was stipulated that no
dividends had been paid.
53 Catalina Homes, Inc., 33 P-H. Tax Ct. Mem. 1491, 1499 (1964).
54 245 F. Supp. 782 (D. Ala. 1965).
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advances constituted a second class of stock and that Subchapter S corporation treatment was not available. 55
A different result was reached in the case of Gamman v. Commissioner.56 This case involved a Subchapter S corporation organized to
build an apartment-motel for the Seattle World's Fair. The corporation
had two 50% holders, each having paid $200 for his capital stock. At
the end of 1962, the corporation had a deficit of $183,000. By this time
the shareholders had advanced $245,000 and guaranteed long-term loans
of $845,000. The court had little difficulty in determining that the corporation was thinly capitalized but had more difficulty with the question
of whether or not the advances constituted a second class of stock. The
court first considered the regulations and held them invalid as being an
extension or modification of the law and beyond the Commissioner's
power. The court considered 1958 legislative history and later acts
which seemed to indicate that the question was one of administrative
convenience. It pointed to the provisions of section 1376 where the
statute contemplated that stockholders would loan money to a Subchapter S corporation. The court believed that the question could not be resolved by an arbitrary rule but required analysis of whether the loans,
in fact, gave the owners any rights different than those given by the
common stock. The court reasoned they did not." The debt was held in
the same proportion as the stockholdings, and the terms of the notes,
in effect, had been waived by the taxpayer. Furthermore, whatever
preferences they received were only those among the stockholders. The
court also pointed out that, in bankruptcy, these loans would have been
subordinated to other claims. The court indicated in dictum that it had
some doubts as to the applicability of the thin capitalization doctrine to
Subchapter S corporations due to the fact that there was no question of
avoiding a double tax on corporate earnings.
The decision was made by the whole court and there were concurring and dissenting opinions. The concurring opinion comes to the same
conclusion but does not invalidate the regulations. It rather says that
the regulation deals with a situation in which the debt is similar to the
stock and that the regulations do not apply when the debt has some
different characteristics. It is interesting that the majority reaches its
conclusion because it feels the debt to be identical to stock in its characteristics, while the concurring opinion places emphasis upon the fact
that the debt had the technically different characteristics of being callable upon demand and bearing interest. There is a dissent written by
Judge Raum based upon the broad theory that the Commissioner's regulations are to be treated as valid unless unreasonably inconsistent with
the statute. He dodges the question of reconciling the regulations with
Id. at 786.
.,846 T.C. No. 1, 1 (April 4, 1966).
'7 Id. at 9.
65
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the legislative intent. He states that the position of the regulations is
consistent with whatever legislative purpose may have induced Congress
to exclude small business corporations with more than one class of
stock from Subchapter S treatment. He concludes that the regulations
are not inconsistent with the words of the statute and that the majority
has spelled out no contrary legislative intent. 5s
The Gamman decision was followed in Lewis Building and Supplies,
Inc. 9 Lewis and his wife owned 700 shares and advanced $12,500 to
the corporation. Laws and his wife owned 300 shares and advanced
$6,000; the shares were purchased for $1.00 per share. Demand notes
were issued for the advances; interest was payable only on demand.
Although the advances were not in proportion to stockholdings, the
court found that the corporation was thinly capitalized. It rejected the
government's contention, based on the regulations, that the advances
constituted a second class of stock as a matter of law. It found that the
stockholders received no greater or different rights by reason of the
advances.
D. Future implications of the Gamman decision. Undoubtedly, the
conflicts created by the court decisions will lead to many more decisions
in this area. Close questions of fact may be involved in the resolution
of these problems. It well may be that the Gamman decision will be interpreted as one in which the purported debt has to be carefully examined to determine whether it is identical to stock and therefore not a
second class of stock. This is rather an ironic rule since then the more
clearly a corporation is thinly capitalized, the more likely the debt will
not be considered a second class of stock. The case which has a close
question of thin capitalization is one which will be held to involve a
second class of stock. For example, if the debt is not pro rata, it might
be considered a second class of stock, because it does give different
rights than common held pro rata. This is also the situation which presents the greatest administrative problem in a thin capitalization case.
The terms of payment of interest may be significant. It may be better
to have advances which bear no interest on their terms. Then the advances may be considered to have the same characteristics as common
stock and to give the person no greater rights. It is important to note,
however, that the Gainman case did not depend in its determination
upon what rights happen to be spelled out in the particular debt agreement; rather, it looked to what the actual relationship was and whether
the debt had given the parties any actual additional rights. Perhaps a
much more satisfactory solution to the problem would be that suggested
in Gamman-that the whole doctrine of thin capitalization is not applicable to the Subchapter S situation. If that is the position taken, there
58 Id. at 14.
59 T.C. Memo 1966-159 (June 30, 1966).
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are no difficulties in connection with profit allocation, and there would
be no reason for denying Subchapter S treatment.
Even if the thin capitalization doctrine is to apply, a determination
could be made that the debt does not constitute stock and thus cannot
constitute a separate class of stock. This has some verbal attractiveness
as it avoids the difficult contention that a note which has a stated interest
rate and a stated maturity is the same "class of stock" as a common
stock certificate. On the other hand, it would seem to create problems
in connection with the allocation of earnings. This would be particularly troublesome in a case where some interest were paid, which would
neither be deductible nor able to be considered as a dividend.
E. The authority to be given regulations. It has long been established that in construing a statute, substantial weight should be given
to any contemporaneous interpretation by those administrative officials
appointed to carry it into effect.60 In tax matters this doctrine might
have been limited to procedural questions 61 in view of the government's
self interest in the outcome. 62 However no such limitation was imposed.

63

Certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code directly delegate
power to issue regulations concerning both procedural matters64 and
substantive questions. 65 Regulations issued pursuant to such delegations
should be given particular weight and probably will be upheld unless
arbitrary.6 6 The constitutionality of such delegation has been upheld."
At the other extreme, if the statute is clear, regulations may not expand
or change its meanings. 68 Both of these principles, although stated as
specialized situations, are probably contained in the general test that
regulations will be upheld unless they are unreasonable or inconsistent
with the statute. It is interesting to compare the statement of this test
in a case upholding the regulations:
This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations
must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent
with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these
statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons. 69
with its statement in a case overruling the regulations:
Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 7 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827).
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
62 Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1951) (Jackson dissenting opinion).
63 See e.g., Lykes v. United States, supra note 62.
64 See e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1375 (e) (3).
63 See e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §1502.
66 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
67 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
68 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) ; United States v. Calamaro, 354
U.S. 351 (1957) ; Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) ; United States
v. Graham, 110 U.S. 219 (1884) ; Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1882).
69 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
60
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The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end
is not the power to make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry
into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A
regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a rule
out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity....
And not
only must a regulation, in order to be valid, be consistent with the
statute, but it must be reasonable.70
These statements of the test raise interesting questions of at least
theoretical interest. What type of construction might be in harmony
with the statute and still be unreasonable? If a court in the absence of a
regulation would come to a contrary conclusion from the regulation, is
it likely to find that such a regulation is reasonable and in harmony with
the statute? Do the regulations really do substantially more than put the
burden of proof on the taxpayer?
Although many of the cases have language indicating that strong
weight is to be given the regulations, 7 1 the courts also independently
consider the merits and usually find the regulation's interpretation to be
in accord with their own interpretation.7 2 On occasion, however, courts
have found the regulations to be out of harmony with the statutes and
overruled them. 73
If a convincing argument can be made that a corporation thinly
capitalized should not be denied Subchapter S treatment, it would not
seem to be too difficult to extend the argument to show that the contrary
regulations are out of harmony with the statute and unreasonable.
Special weight, the courts state, is given to regulations which have
been outstanding a lengthy period of time and which have not been contradicted by reenactments of the sections by Congress.7 4 Although
amendments have been made to Subchapter S since the adoption of the
regulations, Congress does not appear to have given consideration to
the regulations with respect to the one class of stock limitation. It would
seem unrealistic, therefore, to contend that Congress has approved the
regulations which have been issued.
F. The necessity to have debt in a Subchapter S Corporation.It is
submitted that in many cases there is no need to have any debt owing
stockholders of a Subchapter S corporation and that the careful practi7

0 Manhattan General Equipment v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
71 Fawycus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931); Colgate Co. v.

United States, 320 U.S. 422 (1943).
Id.; Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941);
Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
73 Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959); United States v. Calamaro, 354
U.S. 351 (1957); Coady v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd 289 F.2d
490 (6th Cir. 1961) ; Lane, Attacking the Regulations, 52 A.B.A. JOURNAL 187
(1966).
74 E.g., Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327 (1930) ; Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 344 (1935) ; United States v. Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337 (1908).
72
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tioner will advise his clients to advance additional sums in exchange for
stock or else as contributions to capital rather than as loans. For example, if advances are to be made on a pro rata basis, whether or not the
payments are made and labeled interest or made and labeled dividends,
has no economic or tax consequences to the shareholders. The corporation pays no tax and the shareholders will be taxed on the amount in
either event, and the shareholders will be taxed to the full extent of
earnings whether distributed or not.
Thus, for example, if A owned 60% of a corporation and B owned
40%, A advances $6,000 and B advances $4,000. If they are to be paid
$300 and $200 on this advance yearly, it will make no difference whether
these payments are called interest or dividends. Assume that in 1964
the corporation earns $1,000 before making these payments. If the payments are labeled interest, the corporation will have $500 income and
will pay $300 to A and $200 to B, which will be taxable to them as
as interest. A will be taxed on an additional $300 and B on an additional
$200 as undistributed earnings, or these amounts can be distributed to
them. In the event the corporation has no earnings in 1965 but makes
the payments to them, A would be subject to tax on $300 and B on $200
if the payments are considered interest. There would be a net loss of
$500, A getting a deduction on his tax return of $300 and B of $200.
The same results would ensue if the amounts were labeled dividends.
In 1964 the stockholders would be taxed on $500 of dividends and $500
of undistributed income; in 1965 they would not be taxed as the distri74
bution would be of previously taxed income.

There is the risk that in the event of a transfer of stock the credit
for previously taxed income is lost ;'5 and therefore it is advisable in
this, as in all cases, to make distributions of the entire amount of income. Even if such distributions are not made, this seems to be a small
risk compared to the risk of a possible thin capitalization problem. In
the event of repayment of the loan, if it is considered a bona fide loan,
the amount that can be repaid without any tax is a return of capital.
Similarly, any amount paid in redemption of stock may be repaid without tax, if all the earnings have been actually or constructively distributed each year. The amount distributed will merely reduce the stockholder's basis in his stock. However, the basis of the remaining stock
would not be reduced below what it was, had the same amount been
loaned to the corporation and repaid. If there are undistributed earnings, which consist entirely of previously taxed income, again there
would be no tax on the distribution. If, however, the corporation has
accumulated earnings and profits which are not entirely previously taxed
income, any distribution to the shareholder would be a dividend. A re74a If the shareholder had no previously taxed income, still there would be no
tax in 1965 if the corporation had no earnings and profits.
7- Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(e) (1959).
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demption of part of a shareholder's stock would be such a distribution,
unless only some stockholders were redeemed and the redemption was
substantially disproportionate."6 Such a situation might occur if a corporation's earnings and profits exceeded its taxable income and there
was a stock transfer, 77 or because the corporation had operated prior
to electing Subchapter S treatment and had earnings and profits from
this period of time. Because of this problem, when a corporation which
has accumulated earnings and profits elects Subchapter S, it may be
more desireable to utilize debt for any additional advances. Debt will
be more advantageous only if there is a reasonable chance of repayment. If there is such a chance, there should be a strong case to rebut
a thin capitalization argument.
A somewhat more difficult problem arises in the event of debt on a
non-pro rata basis, because the rights of the parties, in effect, are
changed if they take additional stock which has an equal participation
in equity on a non-pro rata basis. If the stockholders are not related
parties, there are important non-tax considerations involved. A stockholder advancing additional funds for debt to a corporation which could
be considered thinly capitalized, when similar advances are not being
made by the other stockholders, should give careful consideration to
whether he is receiving adequate return for his advances. There may
be cases where there is a substantial risk that the advance will not be
able to be repaid, but the stockholder making the advance wants it to
have priority over the stock of the other stockholders. In the case of
corporations in financial difficulty, it may be difficult for the parties to
agree on the value of the stock, and the new advance, if it were taken
in the form of stock, would constitute a substantial percentage of the
total stock. In such situations, however, there would normally be operating losses. Having a larger percentage of stock would increase the
amount of loss deductible on the stockholder's personal return, whereas
having more debt would not increase the shareholder's percentage of
the loss, although it does increase the amount of basis against which
the loss may be taken.78 Furthermore, loans in such a situation may be
considered a second class of stock resulting in the inability of any of
the stockholders to deduct the operating losses.
If non-pro rata advances are being made when the stockholders are
related, the reason for not taking stock must be analyzed. Stockholders
who, for tax purposes, may be considered related may in fact be operating from the same motives as unrelated stockholders described above.
However, the reason for one stockholder making an advance when
others do not, may be that he is the only one with funds to invest and
that he wants to leave the potential for growth with the other stock76 INT. REv. CoE oF 1954 §302.
77 See Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(e) (1959).
78 INT. Rv.
COnE OF 1954 §1376(b) (1959).
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holders. In effect the stockholder may be making a type of gift by loaning the funds rather than taking stock. The estate planning advantages
of such a procedure must be carefully weighed against the danger of a
thin capitalization contention which voids the Subchapter S election.
It is normally advantageous to distribute all of a Subchapter S corporation's earnings. Such earnings are taxed to the shareholders whether
or not distributed, and there is the possibility that the earnings cannot
later be distributed tax free. Many corporations, however, require the
retention of the earnings in the business for expansion. 79 If the corporation has no earnings and profits from a period prior to electing Subchapter S, stock can be redeemed at any time without danger of dividend
taxation as there are no earnings and profits. This can be done, since
undistributed taxable income which is required to be taxed to the shareholders reduces the corporation's earnings and profits. 79a The corpora-

tion should not distribute the earnings and have the stockholders loan
the cash back to the corporation, or even to distribute the earnings in
the form of notes or accounts payable. These procedures are subject to
attack for thin capitalization, since the loans are made pro rata. If a
cash distribution has been made, reinvestment should be in the form of
stock not debt. If the corporation has undistributed earnings from a
period prior to the adoption of Subchapter S, there is still the disadvantage of not being able to redeem the stocks on a tax free basis
unless the distribution is substantially disproportionate.8 0
G. Stockholder's guarantee of third parties' debt. The courts have
held that a debt to a financial institution guaranteed by a shareholder
may raise problems of thin capitalization., Such a rule was necessary
in order to prevent evasion of the rules on thin capitalization. The
courts treat such a bank loan to the corporation no differently than if
the shareholder had borrowed money from the bank and then invested
it in the corporation on the same terms that the corporation has with the
bank. Unfortunately, in the case of small closely held corporations,
guarantees of corporate loans are almost automatically required by
banks. The existence of a guarantee does not necessarily result in a
finding of thin capitalization. The important factor would seem to be
whether the loan is really being made to the corporation, or whether it
is really being made on the strength of the credit of the shareholders
and only technically made to the corporation.
There have not yet been cases on guaranteed loans involving Subchapter S corporations. Although it is likely that an attempt to extend
the doctrine will be made, there is a technical problem in finding what
79 Careful consideration must be given in such cases to the advisability of continuing the Subchapter S election. If the corporate tax bracket is lower than
the shareholders', it would seem advisable to terminate the election.
Ry. CODE OF 1954 §1377(a).
80 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 §302.
81 Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794 (D. Ore. 1965).
79a INT.
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constitutes the second class of stock. The stockholder has made no advance to the corporation, and it is difficult to classify the bank as a
stockholder. Perhaps it can be viewed as if the stockholder borrowed
funds from the bank and loaned them to the corporation. This does not
create any additional rights in the shareholder other than those of his
common stock, so even if the corporation is thinly capitalized there is no
second class of stock. To find a second class of stock requires assuming
that the debt to the bank is really to the shareholder and that it is a
second class of stock. Despite such difficulties it is likely that no distinction will be drawn between direct loans to a corporation by a stockholder and the guarantee of bank loans in situations where the credit of
the shareholder is being relied upon. Again, in those situations where
practical, it would seem much more advisable-even in the case where
the bank loan is really being made on the strength of the corporation's
credit-for the shareholders to borrow the funds and buy additional
stock with it, receiving distributions from the corporation with which
82
to pay off the bank loan.
It appears that the question of thin capitalization disqualifying a
corporation for Subchapter S treatment is an extremely treacherous
trap for the unwary. Those carefully advised can often obtain exactly
what they desire by not making loans to their corporations but by purchasing additional stock.83 It seems particularly unfortunate that those
small corporations without adequate tax counseling are to be trapped in
this manner and subjected to what may prove to be substantial unexpected tax liabilities. The purpose of Subchapter S was to aid the small
closely held corporations, rather than to require them to have to constantly consult tax counsel.
IV.

SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS

The development of law in the areas of thin capitalization may be
a preliminary to an expanded attack on Subchapter S corporations.
It may be contended that a second class of stock can be artificially
created. Perhaps the most fruitful of such areas for the government
is shareholder agreements. It is quite common for small corporations
8 4
to have agreements among shareholders on various matters.
Agreements to which the corporation is a party are particularly
troublesome. The fact that a shareholder's rights are determined by a
separate contractual arrangement with the corporation rather than by
their description in the articles of incorporation seems a tenuous basis
for a distinction. Of course if the agreement gives all the shareholders
identical rights, it should not create any problem of a second class of
82 See Section III-F supra for an analysis of tax consequences.
83 It appears that this could probably have been done in the Subchapter S cases

recently litigated.

84 Some authors have viewed such agreements as essential. Moore and Sorlien,

Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L. REv. 453, 485 (1959).
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stock. At times, however, the majority stockholder or holders may not
be subject to any restrictions under the agreement. Restrictions may be
placed solely on minority holders for quite bona fide business reasons,
and similar restrictions might be inappropriate or meaningless if applied to the majority.
If the corporation is not a party to the agreement, it being merely
among the shareholders, it would seem that this would not create a
separate class of stock. A separate class of stock should be determined
only by the relationship between the corporation and the shareholders
themselves. Perhaps it may be significant whether steps have been
taken to make such an agreement binding on subsequent purchasers of
the stock. s5
The courts, it is hoped, will be less willing to find a second class
of stock in the case of contractual agreements between shareholders
of the corporation, if these agreements, in fact, have no effect upon
earnings and liquidation rights. The rationale behind the one class of
stock limitation would not be applicable. The courts should find it
easier to limit the requirement to its rationale, when they are not faced
with a direct case of a second class of stock, but are being asked to
construct such a class in order to deny the Subchapter S treatment.
Various types of agreements on voting are common, the clearest
example being a voting trust. The Commissioner has taken the position
in his regulations that a voting trust is not an individual holder of
stock, and thus a corporation having a voting trust as a stockholder
would fail to qualify under Subchapter S. s 6 Even if this argument is
not available to the Commissioner, he might contend that different voting rights were being given to different shareholders. In Catalina
Homes, Inc., 87 the Commissioner, in attacking a corporation having

voting trusts, contended both that the trusts resulted in two separate
classes of stock and that the trusts constituted stockholders other than
individuals. Although the court did not pass on these contentions, since
it decided the case on the grounds of thin capitalization, it did indicate
in dictum that it questioned whether the Commissioner's interpretation
was reasonable and in accordance with the congressional intent.
As analyzed previously,88 the question of differences in voting

rights would have no applicability to the question of allocation of
profits (the rationale behind the limitation under Subchapter S.) The
Treasury has ruled, however, that agreements which allocate voting
rights constitute a second class of stock.8 9 In that ruling a partnership
85 See Weinstein, Stockholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19
8

TAx

L. R.v. 391 (1964).

r Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (e) (1959).
87 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964)

text.

88 See Section I-A supra.
89 Rev. Rul. 226, 1953-2 Cur.

Bull. 341.

discussed at footnote 51 and accompanying
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had been incorporated which had had eight active partners and two
limited partners. Although there was only one class of voting common
stock authorized, there was a shareholder agreement which provided
that any shareholder not actively engaged in the business would grant
an irrevocable proxy to one or more of the active shareholders to vote
his shares. The limited partners granted such irrevocable proxies. The
ruling holds that this constitutes more than one class of stock because
the voting power is disproportionate. The Commissioner's contention
in Catalina Homes and the holding in the revenue ruling are particularly significant, not only because they involve the extension of the
one class of stock rule to questions of voting rights, which seems inappropriate, but because they are applied to situations in which the
corporation is not a party to the agreement. Although both situations
involved voting arrangements which did not involve all shareholders,
a voting trust composed of all shareholders may be subject to attack
since the voting trustees have disproportionate power.
Catalina Homes and the ruling raise a number of questions. What
if a proxy is granted for one year? What is the effect of agreement to grant a proxy for only one meeting or an agreement to grant
a proxy to vote on certain specific issues? How important is it that the
proxy is revocable? What is the effect of agreements to elect certain
individuals to the Board? Perhaps a distinction should be drawn between rights given to an individual because of the confidence placed in
him by another individual, and a right given to a share of stock. It
seems somewhat difficult to have differing classes of stock unless the
rights would at least be binding on a successor holder.
Agreements which involve the required payment of dividends
would not constitute a second class of stock, if the dividends were to
be paid to all stockholders. If dividends are to be paid only to some
shareholders, there would be a second class.
It is quite common and often advisable for shareholders of a
closely held corporation to enter into an agreement giving the corporation or other shareholders a right of first refusal on the sale of the
stock. These agreements, it would seem, would not create any problems
of allocation of profits. However, if only some shareholders are subject to such rights of first refusal, which may often be the case, an
argument could be made that there are two classes of stock. This is
particularly true in the situation where the corporation is a party.
A more troublesome type of agreement is one in which there is a
repurchase obligation or option upon the occurrence of certain events
such as death or termination of employment, and there is a formula
price. The formula price may be such that it could be argued to have
an effect on the allocation of the rights to income. It might be contended, for example, that a formula which was based solely on the
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earnings would not give consideration to retention of profits in the
business, and thus a shareholder should not be taxed on undistributed
income because his class of stock does not benefit from it since it will
be eventually purchased solely on the bases of the current earnings.
This argument, however, would neglect the fact that the earnings retained would presumably contribute also to the future earnings of the
business, and it would seem that there would be little inequity in
treating this stock as having the same share of earnings as a share of
stock not subject to such agreement. Nevertheless, if the agreement
is not applicable to all shareholders equally, it may be contended that
it results in differing interests in the assets or in a liquidation preference. The regulations state that either will constitute an additional class
of stock. 0 Fortunately, the regulation language is not clearly applicable
to such agreements, since they do not really modify liquidation or
asset rights. Thus, such agreements can be permitted without having
to attack the regulations.
The reasons for having such agreements not apply to all shareholders are not tax reasons. A closely held corporation, selling stock
to its employees for incentive purposes, wants to restrict their holding
period to that in which they are employees, since only then is the incentive applicable. Such an arrangement may be most important when
the controlling interest in the corporation is held by individuals not
active in the business and yet in that situation the agreement cannot
apply equally to all shareholders. A required repurchase upon death may
be necessary to solve a liquidity problem applicable to only some shareholders because of their age and the composition of their estate.
If, however, the rationale behind the rule is to be completely neglected, and the question is merely one of whether some shareholders
have different rights than other shareholders, any shareholders' agreement, in which all shareholders are not treated the same, raises possible
problems under Subchapter S. Before such agreement is entered into,
a cautious tax advisor will obtain a ruling. It is hoped that, in the
future, published rulings and regulations in this area will give taxpayers certain guide lines to determine what agreements are permissible.
It would be unfortunate to require that such agreements must
necessarily apply to all shareholders. The application of certain rights
of first refusal and redemption rights to the majority stockholder often
would be meaningless and quite impractical to enforce. Thus, even if
the agreement technically applied to all the shareholders, there would
be the additional danger of a contention that this was merely a technical compliance. It would be argued that because the majority stockholders controlled the corporation, the agreement would not be ap90 Treas.
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plied, in fact, to them. Such a doctrine would be extremely harmful
to the congressional policy which was to aid a small business by allowing it to formulate its legal form without having to give consideration to tax factors. The strong business need for shareholder agreements in a closely held corporation, necessitates a clear and definite
reconciliation of these agreements and the one class of stock requirement, if Subchapter S is to be a useful tool.
V.

CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS

There may be a question of whether other types of contractual
rights respecting nonstockholders give rise to a class of stock which
is a second class. This problem would seem to be most severe in the
case of transferable warrants or similar securities which can be converted into common stock. Since such warrants or rights, until they
are exercised, normally have no interest in liquidation or earnings or
voting, it can be argued that they should not constitute a second class
of stock until exercised. The regulations provide that an authorized
second class of stock that is not outstanding will not void a Subchapter
S election. 91 However, it would seem that such warrants might well
raise the mechanical problems previously discussed relating to previously taxed and undistributed earnings. If a corporation has outstanding warrants which can be converted into common stock and yet does
not distribute all of its earnings, the original stockholders may have
paid tax upon earnings, which, after the warrants are converted, are
partly applicable to the warrant holders. Thus, we have the same
problem which was explained in the Senate Finance Committee report.92 For example, if in 1963 a corporation has 100 shares of stock
outstanding and has earnings of $1,000, each holder of one share of
stock would pay tax on $10 of income. These amounts are not distributed. If there are warrants outstanding which are converted in
1964, and in 1964 there is no income, the converted warrants qualify
for 100 additional shares, so there are 200 shares outstanding. If the
$1,000 of prior earnings are distributed, each shareholder would receive $5 of earnings. Those prior shareholders receive the amount free
of tax as a distribution of undistributed earnings, but the tax treatment
of those stockholders who converted warrants would depend upon
whether the corporation had accumulated earnings. It may be argued
that this problem is no greater than any situation in which shareholdings
change from the time undistributed earnings are earned and the time
they are distributed. This problem is one which involves such difficult
mechanical problems that the shareholders should be required to take the
risk of possible inequitable treatment on earnings when they decide to
leave earnings undistributed. However, to the extent that this was the
91 Ibid.
92 S.
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rationale behind the requirement that there be only one class of stock,
it would seem equally applicable to warrants. Furthermore, at the
time the earnings are originally earned, the warrants, in effect, are
increasing in value to the extent that the earnings are earned and are
not being distributed.
The above problem on the question of warrants would be equally
applicable to convertible debtor to any other right, such as a mere
subscription agreement, which gave a shareholder the opportunity to
purchase stock in the future.
It would be expected that a salary agreement which has bonus
computations which were based on profits or earnings should not result in any problem of a second class of stock. Presumably such
amounts would be payable and deductible for purposes of computing
taxable income so as not to result in questions of previously undistributed earnings. However, if such a contract is with a shareholder,
or if it is held that such salary is an unreasonable salary, it may well
be that the contractual right to it is considered a class of stock which
may have different terms than the common stock. Thus, the unreasonable compensation problem may develop into a problem equivalent to
thin capitalization. In situations in which the salary is actually not paid
within the year, the problem of distribution in the future gives rise
to the same mechanical problems which have previously been considered. Here, as in the thin capitalization area, the tax avoidance motives which are normal in unreasonable compensation cases are not
at all applicable in the Subchapter S area. Since there is no double
tax, there is no desire for a stockholder to try to increase his salary
rather than receiving the amount as dividends. However, the possibility
of such an attack and again the disastrous effect of voiding a Subchapter S election indicates that care must be taken to make sure that
compensation paid is, in fact, reasonable.
The danger illustrated by unreasonable compensation is equally
applicable to many areas, such as favorable leases, where there is the
possibility of constructive dividends.
This article has attempted to give some warning as to possible
dangers lurking in the requirement of a single class of stock. At times
the warnings may have had the appearance of a parade of horribles.
It is hoped that before Subchapter S corporations are attacked in the
manner indicated, the Service and the courts will give careful consideration to whether such attack is necessary to prevent abuse and
whether such attack is not inconsistent with Congress's objective in
enacting Subchapter S.

